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THE GENERAL AND THE DIPLOMAT: COMPARING
ANDREW JACKSON AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS ON THE
ISSUE OF FLORIDA AND THE TRANSCONTINENTAL
TREATY OF 1821
By Samuel B. Aly
In July 1818, secretary of state John Quincy Adams stood alone
in President Monroe’s cabinet on an issue of national importance. A
seemingly hot-headed general had overstepped his orders to find a more
comprehensive answer for Seminole Indian raids on the border between
Spanish-held Florida and the southern United States. Secretary of war
John C. Calhoun and secretary of the treasury William Crawford both
remained vehement over
Andrew Jackson’s unauthorized conduct in Spanish Florida after the
President had ordered raids specifically targeting the culpable Seminoles.
John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson both played critical,
contradictory roles in the long, arduous saga of the accession of Florida.
The story culminated in 1821 with the Adams-Onís treaty, examining the
development of republican sentiment on issues such as slavery, Indian
relations, and foreign policy.
The heritage of the two men could not have been more different,
and the early periods of their lives would come to shape many of their
later beliefs. Jackson spent his formative years in the backcountry of the
South Carolina frontier, the son of Scots Irish immigrant parents. The
cultural legacy formed by his family and community contributed heavily
to his Anglophobic beliefs and distrust of elites. His experience as a
fourteen-year old Patriot during the Revolutionary War only cemented
these feelings: after Jackson refused to clean a British officer’s boots, the
Tory struck him with his sword, leaving a scar across young Jackson’s
face that would still be visible in his presidential portraits decades later.1
After serving brief stints in the Tennessee state legislature and
Congress, Jackson entered military life as a general of his state’s militia.
1
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A war hawk through and through, “Old Hickory,” as he would come to
be known, itched for justification to ensure the safety of western settlers
by eliminating native or foreign imperial threats.2 Shifting territorial
claims which defined the first two decades of the nineteenth century led
to instability and constant threat for western expansionists like Jackson.
His volatile tendencies and deeply held sense of honor led to many
varied challenges to duel issued to opponents, rivals, and opponents who
dared slight him or his wife Rachel. Jackson’s most infamous dueling
incident came as a young man in 1806 when he shot and killed Edward
Dickinson, although the effects of Dickinson’s death at Jackson’s hands
was less significant to the public than his allegations that Rachel Jackson
was a bigamist.3 The enduring legacy of Jackson’s early years was that of
a hot-blooded Tennessean unafraid to fight for his honor and kin,
whether that be in a literal or political sense.
In contrast, John Quincy Adams bore the weight of his heritage
every time he signed his name, although not always begrudgingly. The
effects of his father’s participation in the founding and continuation of
the young nation, a bloody struggle which defined Adams’ life as he
watched the Battle of Bunker Hill as an eight-year-old in 1775, were not
without consequence. William Earl Weeks noted that Adams’ heritage
“stressed achievement but condemned personal aggrandizement,” and
that his tasks needed to be carried out without any hint of “selfishness or
personal ambition.”4 This aspect of his personality, more than any
concrete political ideology, was his father’s effect on Adams’ political
style.
The difference between the early lives of Adams and Jackson
provides a wonderfully exemplary view of the greater picture of early
nineteenth century America. The young nation was in a process of
monumental societal change. The political shift from revolutionary
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leaders to the second generation will be discussed later, but there were
many other critical changes occurring as well.
The War of 1812 had a much more recent, immediate impact on
Adams and Jackson’s America than did the War of Independence. The
conflict proved to be the United States’ first real test of sovereignty as a
nation and also served to expose sectional tendencies that were beginning
to predominate the national identity. As westward expansion changed the
political and economic interests of a great deal of Americans, new
attitudes on issues like slavery, national improvements, and foreign
relations (particularly with Great Britain) began to emerge.
Slavery
was decisively bound up in the interests of westerners like Jackson. The
shift away from tobacco along the Atlantic seaboard towards wheat and
cotton in the Deep South led to a massive migration of slave
populations.5 Common estimates place the slave population of the South
at 700,000 in 1790 and 1.5 million in 1820. Such a shocking change is
only made more surprising when considering that the Atlantic slave trade
was abolished in 1808, meaning that the population grew naturally,
rather than through the importation of slaves from Africa. In addition,
new developments like the cotton gin and steamboat found their success
undoubtedly bound up with the development of southern cotton
plantations; the inventions and complicit industries were mutually
reinforcing.
Even before 1812, much of Jackson’s life was linked to the
institution of slavery. In 1804, he acquired the land which would become
the Hermitage, his plantation and homestead outside of Nashville.6
Jackson’s circumstantial entry into the institution in 1788 and his
“relatively modest number [of slaves] indicates that he was a slaveholder
rather than a slave trader.”7 The latter profession became increasingly
lucrative on the domestic front after the abolition of the Atlantic slave
trade due to the changing regional demands for cheap labor across the
southwest, but it was one that Jackson never became involved with.
5 Up to 100,000 slaves moved from the Chesapeake region, known
for tobacco, to the Lower South in the
period from 1790 to 1810.
6 Brands, 148.
7 Ibid., 73.
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Nonetheless, Jackson’s opinions on slavery remained unambiguous. He
understood the interests of his pro-slavery colleagues through experience
and remained a staunch defender of the institution throughout his
political career and the rest of his life.
With the onset of a period of strong republican sentiment, the
elder John Adams’ Federalist Party quickly crumbled under a wave of
broad republican support which indubitably left his son’s political
influences and convictions in doubt. In fact, the younger Adams did as
much as he could to distance himself from the partisan politics of the
time, having seen its divisive effects through his father’s tenure as
president and during his time in Europe serving as foreign minister to
Russia.8 As the Republican Party grew and essentially created a oneparty system in America, Adams found his place in the party to be quite
distinct from other politicians.
Adams’ early life and political career impressed a fierce internal
desire to serve the public and seek the greater good, a craving which
would repeatedly need satisfying over the next few decades. Adams’
strong, individualistic attitude only compounded the power of his
impressive intellectual capacities and budding foreign relations prowess.
Even early in his political career, as a state senator and subsequently a
senator for Massachusetts, his nationalist convictions on issues like
union, neutrality, and expansion of borders would often leave him
crossing party lines and angering partisan allies and constituents.9 His
first major roles in government would be abroad, preparing him for
national prominence upon his return in 1817.
While Adams was in Europe, Jackson left his life as a wellknown, important figure in Tennessee politics to establish himself on the
national stage and earn immense popularity with his military heroics in
New Orleans.10 Before that, though, he played a role in several key
events across the southwest which prepared him for future exploits in
Florida. Both his duel with Dickinson and accusations of involvement in
Aaron Burr’s treasonous plot of 1806 landed him in hot water, as it was
8
9
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never publically determined how large of a role he played in the
conspiracy.11
The most consequential of his adventures in this period before New
Orleans was the Creek War, in which Jackson participated as a military
leader for the United States. The Creek War developed as part of a larger
context which provides clarity for the War of 1812, the development of
the Republican party, and the ideology of men like Andrew Jackson. As
already noted, Jackson held a deep-rooted hatred for the British. This
animosity came to manifest itself in his treatment of the Indians.
During the first decade of the nineteenth century, Shawnee Indian
leaders Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa propagated a native confederacy in
the Ohio Territory. Tenskwatawa, meaning “Open Door,” served as a
shaman, prophet, and religious leader of the confederacy. Their base of
operations came to be Prophetstown, named by American visitors after
the shaman himself, in present day Indiana. Although one major aspect
of the movement was spiritual, Tecumseh served to make it political and
create a military presence.
Tecumseh understood the broader scope of the international
scene in the early nineteenth century and used it to his full advantage,
playing off the tension between the young United States and Great
Britain to solidify pan-Indian unity across the western frontier. With the
outbreak of the War of 1812, Tecumseh and his confederacy, comprised
of many, but not all major Indian groups in the west, allied with the
British. As his goals grew grander, Tecumseh’s quest took him farther
than just his homeland in the Midwest.12
When Tecumseh made a tour south, declaring his message
boldly with his renowned oratory abilities, a division between Creek
tribes created a native civil war which eventually boiled over into a fullyfledged native independence movement in northern Alabama.13 After a
series of retaliatory attacks back and forth, the massacre of over 250

11
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American settlers, including many women and children, at Fort Mims on
August 30, 1813 sparked panic across the southern frontier.14
After having several attempts at military glory stymied by orders
from higher up and personal injuries, Jackson finally took this
opportunity to put his ideology into practice by driving out natives from
the south. In a sweeping campaign all the way through Alabama to the
Gulf Coast, Jackson dismantled Creek settlements and forts, civilian and
military alike, which culminated in the devastating Battle of Horseshoe
Bend and ended the Creek struggle altogether.15 Tecumseh’s death at the
hands of William Henry Harrison the previous year had foreshadowed
the demise of organized Indian resistance in the west, and the Creeks
were one of the last significant military groups to be abated.16
The general had silenced the Creek threat. The Treaty of Fort
Jackson, signed on August 9, 1814, opened up a vast swath of land from
Tennessee to the Gulf of Mexico for white settlement and advanced the
interests of Jackson’s allies.17 For Republicans like Jackson and Adams,
Indian populations became a direct hindrance to westward expansion
completely incompatible with their interests. Although the fight for
Indian removal in Georgia would take another decade to come to a close
under Jackson’s presidency, its origins lay in the period after the War of
1812. Westerners remembered all too well the immense threat that
Tecumseh’s confederacy and the Creek War presented. These issues
became critical for republican nationalists in the westward expansion
movement, and they would later weigh heavily on the decisions made on
the federal level under Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, as the
executive branch carefully negotiated the unique early nineteenth century
blend of Indian relations and foreign policy.
In 1814, after Adams served a prolific five-year term as minister to Czar
Alexander I and Russia, President Madison called him to serve as
chairman for the nation’s delegation to peace negotiations with Britain in
Ghent. Adams succeeded in leading the delegation to peace talks,
although very little was accomplished in terms of pragmatic change on
14
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17 Parsons, The Birth of Modern Politics, 29.
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American issues prior to the war. The gap between British and American
demands was too broad to cross in many cases. Adams would become
“especially incensed by the British insistence on granting Indians
permanent territorial rights,” which would limit westward expansion in a
more concrete manner.18
Quincy Adams had reported to his father three of his concerns—
fishing rights, the western and northern borders between American and
British holdings, and Native American relations—although he had
ignored two other major issues: impressment and freedom of trade in the
Atlantic during wartime.19 However, the treaty is significant in the
broader historical scope.
In the words of Adams biographer, James Traub, the agreement “marked
the end of the first, and very fragile, stage of American political
history.”20 The treaty was a turning point at which the republic’s federal
government was, at least pragmatically, free of potent foreign military
threats to the east and able to turn its attention to domestic policy and
westward expansion. John Quincy Adams stood at the helm of this
catalyst of a new period of American affairs, and within five years he
would assume a new role as Secretary of State and establish a legacy by
his own right. After resolving peace at Ghent, Adams spent almost two
years serving as an envoy to Britain. When he finally returned from his
eight years of European assignments in August 1817 with a healthy
record of diplomatic successes in tow, Adams carried the reputation of
being a politician unfettered by politics who had successfully bargained
for a surprisingly favorable peace agreement.21 Simultaneously,
Jackson’s heroics in New Orleans in 1815 had provided a similar end,
that of growing national fame, by entirely opposite means.
This moment of correlation was one of the first, but more were
to follow. The two figures found their political origins in a time which
came to be known by historians as the Era of Good Feelings. Both

18
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Adams and Jackson had to establish themselves on the national stage by
their merits found in a fully-functioning republic.
For decades after the American Revolution, revolutionary
leaders had played the major roles national politics. The first four
presidents—Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison—had all
participated in the leadership of the War of Independence. When James
Monroe was inaugurated on March 4, 1817, he would become the final
president of revolutionary fame. Quincy Adams and Jackson had been
young during the war and it had certainly made lasting impressions on
them both; however, they were not active players in the war in a
significant way. Experiences such as these informed and motivated
Quincy Adams and Jackson’s actions in regards to the quickly escalating
Florida issue. Quincy Adams had to approach the situation from his
newly-appointed position of Secretary of State, which led towards an
attitude of moderation and pragmatism. Jackson still held a regional
position, therefore he was more concerned with satisfying his southern
republican nationalist constituents who despised Spain and feared Indian
violence.
Florida had been an enticing prospect for southerners since the
beginning of the century. Not only would it appease their seemingly
insatiable desire for land, but Florida’s position made it critical to
national security. George Dangerfield wrote of a common adage from the
day:
“whoever possessed the Floridas held a pistol at the heart of the
Republic.”22 The fear of Britain using the territory as a base of operations
in the Deep South had been prevalent during the War of 1812. These
concepts contributed to Jackson’s conviction of the necessity of a
military solution to the Florida problem.
However, Jackson’s invasion of Florida proved to be more
complicated than his showdown with the British in New Orleans three
years earlier. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun appointed Jackson
leader of the campaign against Native Americans on the nation’s

22
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southern border on Dec 26, 1817.23 Two factors contributed to the
necessity of the mission: the weakness of Spanish authority in Florida
and the large number of resettled Creek Indians from the Mississippi
Valley (the same group Jackson had been responsible for relocating a
few years earlier) who continued to harbor runaway slaves and cross the
border to raid American settlers in Georgia. Local independence
movements against Spanish imperial forces in South America caused a
dilemma for foreign heads of state—a hot topic of debate in American
politics in the late 1810s. Because of the turmoil in places like Simon
Bolivar’s Caracas, Spanish colonial authorities had little time and effort
to expend on Florida.24 By opposing resolutions to send ministers to the
newly created and semi-legitimate governments in South America,
Adams held onto another bargaining chip in the broader game between
Spain and the U.S., one that he would be willing to wield in future
negotiations.25
The general’s actions in Florida were successful from a military
perspective, but untenable from a foreign relations standpoint. The
Seminole forces along the border of Western Florida were scattered and
now posed little threat to Americans on the Georgia side of the border.
However, the general had gone even farther. Jackson and his men had
captured the Spanish settlements of St. Marks and Pensacola in May
1818, established a U.S. customs house in the larger of the two towns,
deposed the Spanish governor, and executed two British citizens accused
of colluding with the Seminoles.
In a situation only aggravated by slow, unreliable lines of
communication, by June the Monroe administration finally discovered
the havoc that Jackson had wreaked in Florida. The campaign
accomplished its primary objectives of dispersing natives and breaking
their presence in northern Florida, but it also committed various illegal
and arguably unwarranted acts which placed Monroe in an untenable
position. On June 18, 1818, Adams wrote that, in particular, Jackson’s
23 David S. Heidler, “The Politics of National Aggression: Congress
and the First Seminole War,” Journal
of the Early Republic 13, no. 4 (1993): 504.
24 Dangerfield, 128.
25 Weeks, 104.
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capture of Pensacola “contrary to his orders” caused “many difficulties
for the Administration.”26
These actions were atrocious corruptions of power, at least according to
Calhoun, Crawford, and others in the President’s cabinet. Adams
observed the situation from the opposite perspective, partially out of
necessity in his role as Secretary of State. He would be the one
responsible for determining how to approach the Spanish ambassador,
the American public, and the greater international community, all of
whom fixed their eyes on Washington in awaiting a response to what was
surely an unconstitutional action made by General Jackson. Upon
receiving news in June 1818 of the loss of Pensacola, Don Luis de Onís,
the Spanish minister in Washington, desired nothing less than a full
reprimand of the general; in fact, he refused to believe that Jackson’s
actions against his colonial authorities could have been authorized to any
degree by Washington.27
Other members of the president’s cabinet, namely Secretary of
War John C. Calhoun and Secretary of the Treasury William Crawford,
were outraged at Jackson’s disobedience. Adams recorded in his diary on
July 15, 1818 that Calhoun seemed “personally offended” at the idea that
one of his major generals would exceed his rank by committing actions
like Jackson had in Florida.28 However, for the president and the
Secretary of State, the response was not a simple one to formulate.
Part of this process remains blurred to the historian, for it must
be noted that Jackson’s orders were ambiguous enough to have been left
up to interpretation. Whether this was an oversight or an intentional lack
of clarity given to a man with a temper and a reputation for vengeance is
still debatable.29 However, on July 21, 1818, Adams listed three reasons
in his diary for refusing to side with Onís and the Spanish: the admittance
would imply “weakness of confession”; it would serve as a “disclaimer
of power in the Executive [which] is of dangerous example and of evil
consequences”; and the fact that “there is injustice to the officer
26 John Quincy Adams, The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845, ed. Allan
Nevins. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), 198.
27 Weeks, 113.
28 John Quincy Adams, 199.
29 Brands, 323-4.
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[Jackson] in disavowing him, when in principle he is strictly
justifiable.”30
Adams communicates several key issues in this writing. First of
all, he addresses one of his main concerns—which was not only foreign
policy but the power of the executive to form military and foreign policy.
Any concession made by an apology to the Spanish would surely be
brought up in the future as justification for removing powers from the
executive branch of government.31 In the young republic, any federal
action set extreme precedent, a fact of political life that Adams was
keenly aware of. Additionally, Adams believed Jackson was justified in
his actions. During the period between the capture of Pensacola and
Onís’ demand for punishment to be enacted upon Jackson, neither
Adams nor Monroe sent additional orders to the general in Florida.32
Their response was not as swift and easily formulated as Onís clearly
thought it would be.
It was at this point that John Quincy Adams made a stand in
defense of the beleaguered general. One possible motivational factor in
this was the extreme popularity Jackson had gained across the country,
particularly the West. His victories against the Creeks earned him a
heroic reputation in the South, and the Battle at New Orleans widened his
base of support across the nation.33 A severe punishment would have
been extremely unpopular with the public; this was not a risk the Monroe
administration wanted to make as it approached the 1820 election season.
After several debates within the Cabinet on how to resolve the issue,
Adams mitigated the initially harsh ideas of Monroe and Calhoun into a
light reprimand for Jackson and the return of Pensacola to the Spanish.34
Adams’ bold apology proved crucial in the way in which Monroe was to
handle the situation.
This situation made the correlation between Jackson and Adams
quite clear. The two represented different sides of the same coin—that
coin being the Republican party, which dominated the Era of Good
30
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Feelings and played a major part in the development of the antebellum
United States. Lynn Parsons wrote, “The Adams-Jackson alliance, if it
may be called that, was based partly on genuine admiration and partly on
a mutually shared goal. Each man desired to acquire Florida for the
United States. Adams hoped to do it by diplomacy and cash, Jackson by
force, if necessary.”35 The shared objectives clearly aligned on the
Florida issue, a fact which had a significant impact on Adams’ defense of
Jackson.
However, Adams needed Florida to be acquired legally. Whether
that be through force or diplomacy was a later issue, but to set a
precedent on the international stage of unconstitutional attacks on foreign
powers would have been diplomatic suicide for the young republic. In
July 1818, Monroe included in a letter to Jackson that the general’s
actions authorized by the executive branch alone would have been
illegal, that “Congress alone possess the power” to declare war.36
Adams and Onís continued their long-winded debates and
negotiations. Onís was an experienced minister; he understood the gains
he could hope to achieve for his country with its severely limited
bargaining power.37 Although the Spanish minister claimed that
Jackson’s misconduct “had set back treaty negotiations, [both Onís] and
the secretary of state knew that it only gave further emphasis to Spanish
vulnerability.”38 The negotiations were long and hard-fought.
Only by conceding that the western border be placed at the
Sabine River, rather than the Rio Grande, was the Adams-Onís Treaty
finally agreed upon by the Spanish minister.39 Although the treaty
granted Adams all of his demands, most importantly the accession of
Florida, it was not without fault for some nationalists. The move was
unpopular with westerners dreaming of opportunities for expansion into
Texas, but that issue would be solved later.

35
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After the resolution and a brief controversy over land grants,
which stalled proceedings and gave Adams a fright over what he thought
had been a huge success, the Adams-Onís Treaty was ratified by the
Senate in February 1821.40 The Florida territory was now legally and
unequivocally American land. Furthermore, the treaty addressed issues
of territory disputes along the western border—an issue which had
caused tensions since the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. The Spanish had
disputed the legality of the French sale of Louisiana, and the boundary
blurred around Texas and farther west. With the treaty in 1820, the
western border was finally agreed upon; it included the land north of the
forty-first parallel all the way to the Pacific Ocean. This Transcontinental
Treaty, as it came to be known, was a relief for the president and other
interested parties, even if the border had not been set to include Texas.
In the meantime, Jackson had been dealing with the political
ramifications of his invasion. A Senate committee condemned the
executions of the British nationals, as well as the taking of Pensacola and
St. Marks.41 In Jackson, men like Calhoun and Clay saw a potential rival
growing in popularity among their constituency; they strove,
unsuccessfully, to limit his political growth.42 Fortunately for Jackson,
nothing came of the committee report on his actions.
Ironically, he was soon on his way to become governor of the territory;
its capital was Pensacola.43
In 1822, Adams wrote, “General Jackson had rendered such
services to this nation that it was impossible for me to contemplate his
character or conduct without veneration.”44 The two continued to have a
cordial relationship until the election of 1824, at least publicly. The split
of the Republican party and Adams’ deal with Crawford, which would
assure him the presidency over Jackson, did little to assuage any personal
animosity between the two men. After Jackson’s allegations of
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corruption by Adams and Crawford in the election, the relationship
between the two men continued to deteriorate for the rest of their lives.45
However, it was in the Florida situation that the historical
relationship between the two solidified. The two men had entirely
different backgrounds and experiences leading up to the affair. Whereas
New Englander Adams served as a foreign minister and came to thrive in
the minutia of nineteenth century foreign relations, Jackson brought a
western war hawk perspective into the Era of Good Feelings with his
fiery, forceful attitude. Each addressed issues like slavery, westward
expansion, and Indian relations in his own way. John Quincy Adams and
Andrew Jackson often shared similar goals, but the means to those ends
varied entirely.

45 See Lynn Parsons, “In Which the Political Becomes the Personal, and Vice
Versa: The Last Ten Years of John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson,” Journal of the
Early Republic 23, no. 3 (Autumn 2003).
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